What Americans Really Think About Democracy in 2020

 

Here's the interview with someone at a Trump rally that I'm waiting to see:

"You think Trump actually won this election?"

"Absolutely. A ton of fake votes were cast all over the country."

"You know he's losing all his law suits?"

"That's not surprising. Democrat judges are believing whatever they see on left-wing media instead of looking at the clear facts before them, the ballots found in drainage ditches, the dead people voting, all that stuff."

"OK, but suppose Trump really did lose the Electoral College as well as the popular vote?"

"He didn't."

"I get it. But just suppose for a second that he lost anyway, that there's more stupid dems in the country than anybody realized, or whatever. Just pretend that's true for a second."

"OK."

"Would you support Trump staying as President anyhow?"

"I would. I'd think he should stay on as our president."

"Why is that?"

"Because I believe this country is too important for the people to let it be taken over by left wing extremists."

That is the money interview, because it shows where democracy stands among people's priorities. What percentage of the 70 million Trump supporters would exalt their hero (sent from God maybe) far above the paltry value they place on legitimate self-government?

To be fair, a substantial number of Hillary Clinton supporters might have said similar things in 2016. My book can be largely seen as a detailed attempt to reset these priorities.

Three Important Virtues of Approval Voting (that I plan to detail in a new paper)

 

Approval Voting (“AV”) has had its champions. In their eponymous book on the subject, Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn set forth a list of eight characteristics that they take to make for the unparalleled virtues of the scheme:

1.       It gives voters more flexible options.

2.       It could increase voter turnout.

3.       It would help elect the strongest candidate.

4.       It would give minority candidates their proper due.

5.       It is relatively insensitive to the number of candidates running.

6.       It is superior to preferential voting [e.g., RCV or The Single Transferable Vote].

7.       It will add legitimacy to the outcome.

8.       It is eminently practicable.

 

In my new book I joined the ranks of AV advocates, claiming that it is uniquely capable of playing a crucial part in an accurate determination of “the general will”—what the people want. I argued, in particular, that AV’s exclusive reliance on minimally successful (as conceived ex ante) states of affairs makes it the perfect electoral correlate for what I designated “CHOICE Voluntarism,” a theory of prudential value that assigns each “successful result”—as well as each person—equal respect/weight. While I do not think that frequent use of of a simple quasi-majoritarian mechanism like AV can alone completely capture the general will of an electorate (largely because, in my view, there must also be provisions for robust proportional representation, recall, referendum, and reversal, as well as an explanation of how the two recommended voting systems should be combined), I do think that AV is an essential constituent of an authentically democratic system.

But there was insufficient space in my book to include comprehensive discussion of several important merits of AV or to respond to every criticism that has been made of the scheme. No doubt I will likely miss several of them in my new paper too. But the three advantages to be discussed that AV has over every preference-based (ranking) voting rule seem to me make AV’s inclusion crucial to the construction of any authentic democracy. What are they?

I will argue first that AV cannot be convicted of irrationality due to any alleged failure to guarantee results that are independent of “irrelevant alternatives.” Second, I will show that AV eliminates the possibility of using agenda-setting to produce results that are inconsistent with majoritarianism and pluritarianism. Finally, I will explain why AV is not subject to the majority voting cycles that have troubled observers from Condorcet to Arrow. 

It is my hope that I will have an opportunity to summarize this paper in an APSA meeting next Fall on the West Coast.

What is “Distilled Populism”? (And Is It Dangerous?)

I cannot here defend the particular items I believe to be required for distilled populism. For complete arguments, please consult my new book. Here, I will simply enumerate. But it is important that one not set down a particular list of this type and then try to use it to defend the thesis of democratic harmlessness by noting that nobody who has advocated for precisely those elements has been terribly dangerous. For it could be that no well-known person has pushed all and only these items. We must rather say that all those who have advocated for no more than this list of propositions or any subset of them have been as harmless as the turtle dove. We can concede, though, that it is extremely hard to find advocates for, e.g., regular elections, free speech, and proportional representation, who have not also plumped for, e.g., equality of income or jobs for every able-bodied citizen). Nevertheless, we may insist that those who are good historical examples of distilled populists have never been violent rabble-rousers. Obviously, however, to make that case we need to have a better sense of precisely what distilled populism is.

So, here is a (coarsely put) list of items that I believe should be considered fundamental (i.e., ensconced in something like a constitution or other extremely difficult to repeal or amend norm) to anything that can correctly call itself an authentic democracy:

1. It takes as axiomatic that self-government is an intrinsic good. Thus, it will not move from a proposition allowing the people to demand, by fair plebiscite open to all, what they want from their government.

2. It allows for impairments or restrictions of political speech, assembly or association to be imposed only where they are consistent with recognition and enforcement of the paramount importance to democracy of activities that foster self-government. These activities include such items as (i) facilitating access to reliable political information, (ii) making voting easier or fairer, and (iii) creating opportunities to attain political office or interact with governmental officers and agencies.

3. Each person and each officially expressed desire of such person for social action shall be guaranteed equal treatment and equal protection of the law. No discrimination based solely on race, creed, gender, orientation, property accumulation or other such characteristic, when irrelevant*, shall be allowed by governmental or non-governmental entities, and all long-term residents having reached sixteen years of age shall receive an equal vote, have equal access to ballots and candidacy for government offices, and have abundant, reliable, cost-free information relevant to such ballots and offices available to them. Governmental elections shall be frequent within all political subdivisions.

[*Because of what votes actually are, voter knowledge, intelligence, goodness, or other such alleged "credentials" are irrelevant.]

4.  Consistent with the principles set forth above, elections shall be determined based on the fair and accurate count of voter approvals, where those receiving the most approvals win. But every significant subdivision of the people shall also have its proportionate say in the administration of government through the election of additional representatives, where (i) such subdivisions are mutually exclusive subsets of the populace determined by asking voters whom they would most like to represent them, and (ii) significance is determined solely on the basis of group size.

5. The amount of ultimate authority to make government policy wielded by each representative shall always be a strict function of the total number of voters that have approved of that representative. But individuals chosen to represent either an entire populace or a significant subdivision therein shall each be provided with fair and equal opportunity to speak and equally-weighted votes in committees. Deliberation and bargaining among representatives shall always proceed according to the best current science regarding what deliberative procedures are most likely and efficiently to produce concord; provided, however, that such procedures shall require that simultaneous approval votes on all alternatives—including no change to the status quo—must always be used in lieu of successive individual votes on amendments and final votes on enactment.

6. Governmental officers shall be subject to recall, enacted laws shall be subject to repeal by referendum, and certain types of judicial decisions shall be subject to reversal by votes of the relevant electorate.

7. Disparities in the ability to produce and disseminate campaign and other election-related materials based on wealth are to be kept to a minimum.

With these general criteria for distilled populism in hand, we can begin to compile a list of historically significant events that have either accomplished a substantial increase in democracy through implementation of one or more of these principles, or failed in an (at least apparent) attempt to do so. And with that list we can try to assess the level of any alleged dangers of this sort of populism. There have, of course, also been numerous successes. Wars of independence against colonial or other conquering powers are obvious examples of democracy-enhancing events, since successes have produced at least the possibility of achieving popular sovereignty in those territories. To those we could add the 19^th Century events of the Emancipation Proclamation in the U.S. and the Parliamentary Reform Acts is Britain. Increases in women’s rights have been secured in many parts of the world, and younger people have gained the franchise. In the U.S. alone, in addition to passage of the Voting Rights Act in the 1960s, one could also count enactments of numerous state laws allowing for recall of representatives or referendums on statutes as successes. All these have been obvious enlargements of democracy.

But “success” is ambiguous. In the case of the English Civil Wars and the Russian Revolution, monarchies were (either temporarily or permanently) eliminated, but in the former case the quite democratic first Agreement of the People was never enacted, and in the latter case the Constituent Assembly, long sought by those Narodniks most committed to the listed principles was immediately dissolved by Bolsheviks. We may thus distinguish ultimate from subordinate successes. Authentic democracy advocates were surely pleased by the deposing of monarchs, the enactment of more democratic blueprints for government or the calling of representative conventions or other assemblies, but those who were not executed or exiled will not have been pleased by the longer-term consequences of dictatorships, anarchy, or even (as in the case of Burundi) genocide. Thus, democratic advocates may succeed in enacting an apparently democracy-enlarging law, but that change may produce no actual growth in self-governance or its possibility, making the entire process something such advocates would themselves consider a failure. Neither the Constitution imposed by the Montagnards during the French Revolution nor the one passed by referendum in 1992 Botswana produced any real increase in democracy. And again, both of those events were followed by massacres and dictatorships.

“Success” is ambiguous in another way too. One who does not share my view that every increase in democracy is an intrinsic good could well deem a clear “success” in the enlargement of democracy as a societal failure. That sort of divergence in the assessment of merits or demerits is ineliminable; every individual must operate according to basic axiological categories that cannot be discarded.  Thus, even where there is no question that there has been an ultimate “success” in the growth of populistic principles within some group, criticisms can be expected from those who disapprove of such enlargements.

How, then, can one make a case that the advocates and advocacy of authentic democracy are “nothing to be feared”? One tack is to take at their precise words those who are horror-struck by “excessive democracy.” That should provide evidence of what it is about “mob tyranny” that has concerned significant numbers of observers. With that information we can investigate whether democracy advocates have often been responsible for the production of the particular evils forecasted. Surely it is no surprise to discover that the belief that “the poor, uneducated, ravenous rabble” ought to have the same authority to make public policy as “more cultivated, dispassionate and public-spirited” members of the community has been controversial at all times. There should be little doubt that the indictments of democracy, whether coming from the Ancient Greeks or from the libertarians of today have often focused on the matters of the alleged ignorance, irrationality, covetousness, rapaciousness. And it is unsurprising that those promoting inalienable protections for one’s person and property seems a much safer than an advocate for letting all the people do (and take!) whatever they happen to want. But the fears have imagined specific results, so if we are to assess the reasonability of the epistocratic axioms, we must try to discover if those consequences have actually come to pass.

A quick look at some of the horrific events occurring in the aftermaths of the French and Russian Revolutions or of the Burundi Referendum of 1993, ranging from land seizures to rapes and disembowelments, shows distinct similarities to the dangers long prophesied by opponents of democracy. How, then, can one sensibly claim that no one ought to fear the advocates of populism? I propose we look more closely at a few “successes” and “failures” of democratic enlargements to see if the accusations bear scrutiny. Below I have given 11 well-known attempts—some broad some quite specific—to increase democracy in various times and places. I will in time also provide what I think should be taken as fairly obvious marks of intermediate “success,” and the actual intermediate and ultimate outcomes of those efforts. I will also include the means utilized by advocates to enact these changes. 

Group	Claimed Goals
Levellers	(First) Agreement of the People
Girondists	Condorcet Constitution
Socialist Revolutionary Party	All-Russia Constituent Assembly
Front for Democracy in Burundi	Multi-Party, Multi-Ethnic, Majority Rule Governance
19th Century American Suffragists & 20th Century ERA Backers	Equal Rights for Women
Abolitionists	Black Male Suffrage
German Social Democratic Party	Creation of a Democratic Republic
Western U.S. Progressives	Referendum and Initiative Petition
Western U.S. Progressives	Proportional Representation
Midwestern U.S. Progressives	A Non-partisan Unicameral Legislature
Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee	Fairer Access to Ballots for African Americans

No doubt this list will be seen as arbitrary and capricious, as it includes, along with a few seemingly random law changes in various jurisdictions (including subsidiary ones) a democratic election in the tiny central African country of Burundi, while ignoring such historic events as the casting off of colonial power in the United States, India or any South American or country. It is also heavily weighted with events that occurred in the US. I do not wish to insist there is anything particularly representative about this list. I claim only that it provides a fairly broad assortment of events covering many of the most common aspects of attempts at democratic reform. Those believing that the choice of different or additional events would provide countervailing evidence are of course welcome to specify such examples and make their arguments.

Stay tuned. I hope to take up the items in my own admittedly idiosyncratic list in future blog entries.

How Politics Currently Works

 

This is probably all in Ibsen (and surely is in Christopher Buckley) but it bears repeating every once in awhile.
  

Suppose you're in a position of power and you want to do something that is either unpopular or only marginally popular—say raise taxes, or entirely "open up the economy" during a virulent pandemic, or allow banks to redline. Whatever. You're hellbent to do this thing. It doesn't matter whether you want this because you think it's the right thing to do, because you want to make some lobbyists happy, or because you've been convinced by an economist you believe to be brilliant. The thing is, you want to do it, and you think you have the power. 

Do you make the case for your position?  Maybe win over some of the populace (or legislature) who are on the fence?  You could I suppose, but even if you win out, it might be very divisive. I mean, if a free market economist you trust has convinced you that not just a segment of the business community, but the population as a whole will benefit from letting banks either reject minority applicants or charge them higher interest rates, even if you can convince half the populace (or a little more) of this miracle, you will have wildly alienated the remainder. There could be angry editorials, sit-ins, maybe even riots! Certainly you will have decreased your chances of keeping this power indefinitely. This is "the intensity problem of majority rule" that I discuss at some length in my book. 

https://www.amazon.com/Democratic-Theory-Naturalized-Foundations-Distilled/dp/179362495X/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1QXRB534GVIVZ&dchild=1&keywords=democratic+theory+naturalized&qid=1603542155&sprefix=democratic+theory+%2Caps%2C164&sr=8-1 

But the suggestions I give for handling it there are structural, theoretical and admittedly fantastic, things like switching to a system involving both Approval Voting and the Single Non-Transferable Ballot. What about concrete, functional advice for you--the powerful politician--right now? Should you forget about the whole thing and just go back to ribbon-cutting? Again, you certainly could, but that would just contradict our original premise—that you really really want to accomplish this change. (Maybe there's a bribe involved, or a promise of huge future support in any attempt of yours for even greater power/authority. Or maybe you think getting this important change through is the only sure road to heaven--especially after your sinful life.) Is there another option? 

Absolutely. As the affairs maven (Robert Morse) tells his eager student (Walter Matthau) in Guide For the Married Man (and as Joey Bishop hilariously demonstrates), if there's a complaint you just deny everything. Think of President Trump's claims these days that COVID-19 is now "turning the corner."

How does that work here? Simple. Have your press person simply deny that these are actually taxes, or claim that the effective marginal rates for most people will actually go down under your proposal. Insist that you Simply Will Not Tolerate Any Redlining—PERIOD--So of course that can't be what this is!! All the while, you do exactly the opposite of what you're saying.

Sure, a half dozen people and maybe a journalist or two might see what's really going on and try to call you on it. (That's certainly true with the Trump COVID example, but that's only because stripped down, as I have it here, it doesn't include throwing in any codicils about testing, co-morbidity, asymptomatic cases, or any number of other of complicating variables or even errant nonsense.) But the idea is the same: you just calmly insist that naysayers don't understand your proposal, because you actually agree with them. It is their (only apparent) objections that are misguided, confused, and would themselves be harmful to taxpayers, minorities, or families trying to stay healthy, as the case may be. If you do this well, the objections will eventually dissipate sufficiently, particularly if your proposal is complicated enough and/or your defense particularly convoluted and uttered with righteous indignation. And, of course, you need to be suave and believable. I mean, in the movie, the Joey Bishop character's wife actually catches him in bed with another woman, but he's able to completely deflect her concerns with just a few remarks like "Who?" and "What are you talking about?" And throughout this loving colloquy his mistress is getting dressed, making the bed, and leaving.

That's how people in power can (and often do) get what they want without wasting much political capital. This is cynical, certainly, but the minorities can (and do) also try to make significant policy changes using this method. After all, it's just simple advice on how not to be too divisive, whether or not you currently have the votes to get what you want. 

In a word, this is how politicians GET THINGS DONE. And, after all, isn't that the one promise that most of us really want our candidates to keep if we put them in office? 

In his early Confessions of a Conservative, Garry Wills reminds us that the most important thing a politician can ever do is defer to whichever constituent he or she is talking to at any moment. He says, “Each time a politician indulges his or anyone else’s single opinion or principle” is an example of “losing an opportunity to ingratiate oneself with those who hold different views or standards—a criminal waste."

That manner of representation no doubt makes for a vapid kind of populism. But it's all--indeed the best--that the present system of representation in the U.S. can provide. What I try to demonstrate in my book is that it is only to the extent that real populism or authentic democracy begins to take precedence in a politician’s pantheon of goals that the sort of political machinations described above become feeble, and representation stops being absurd. 

What, Exactly, IS Democracy? And Why Should We Care About It?

It is very common--indeed quite reasonable!--for people to wonder what the point is of voting. After all, everybody knows that a single vote is incredibly unlikely to make a difference in any election. This is a very sensible question, particularly when the electoral system in place gives individuals so little opportunity to indicate what they actually want from their governments. It doesn't have to be that way, though. There are many ways that elections can be structured that would provide much more voice to every person who participates. 

In the last chapter of my book, Democratic Theory Naturalized: The Foundations of Distilled Populism,

(https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/179362495X/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i0 )

I give this little parable, which I think may help answer the "Why bother?" question--at least in jurisdictions that have done the work to make votes and voting really matter to each resident: 

Consider a village society in which the central council provides a large feast for all the citizens each week. The way the feast has been arranged is that the council cooks a giant stew. The cooks have all the ingredients except seasoning: that is supplied by the villagers. Each person in this community may donate one equal-sized packet of either salt, pepper, cardamom, cilantro, oregano, garlic, basil or something entirely tasteless that still takes up the same amount of volume. So those who like salty food will bring salt, those who like garlic will bring that, etc. Those who like bland food will bring the tasteless seasoning, and those who don’t care one way or the other will likely abstain (or come with whatever their families or friends urge them to bring). 

Since the villagers’ participation or non-participation doesn’t make the stew larger or smaller, there can be no free-rider complaint directed toward those not bringing anything but getting to eat anyhow. So, it seems there is no good reason for making participation compulsory. But if you like garlic, it is foolish not to bring some—even if your failure to do so is unlikely to make an appreciable difference in the taste of the stew because of the small size of the packet you are allowed. You may need there to be 100 packets of garlic in all for the stew to take on a bit of that flavor, but if you put your packet in, only 99 others will be needed. Encouragement of other garlic lovers may help—so you must be free to do that; and it must be the case that the council won’t just throw out the garlic packets because one of the elders doesn’t like the stuff. 

On the view urged in this book, to vote is to make your own contribution to the “taste” of the society you will have. While it ought not to be required of you, it will be the case that a failure to add your own fragment of the people’s will—however small—is just self-harm—unless you really don’t care one way or the other. If you do care about the result, voting is made easy (i.e., nearly cost-free), and you have good reason to believe that your vote will be fairly counted and the electoral results will be appropriately constitutive of government actions, it seems almost irrational not to insert your own packet of government seasoning.

Of course, the actual systems we're working in--the cards we've been dealt--do not have many of the characteristics I claim are required for authentic democracy. But the only way to get closer is to vote for representatives who may be open to considering changes that would make our country more democratic. 

So we can do our little parts even now. VOTE. It ain't much, but it's all we've got.

What is Wrong With One of Hamilton's Most Famous Federalist Papers

In Federalist 15, Alexander Hamilton asks, 'Why has government been instituted at all?' He gives us this answer: “Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint.” Hamilton and his fellow Founders believed that freedom (mainly of white male adults to obtain and retain property) requires careful protection, and they felt sure that the key to accomplishing that goal was to restrain groups (or 'factions') from getting up to mischief. Although Hamilton took factions to be nothing but bundles of individuals who each have fundamental rights, he believed that restricting the allowable activities of the factions themselves (conceived as whole units) was absolutely crucial to the preservation of personal liberties.

Was it that Hamilton denied that factions might have their own desires, so that they, unlike real persons, do not require protection of (the merely metaphorical) 'freedom to pursue their own happiness'? Not at all. Indeed, his view that groups are infected with 'a poison of spirit' that causes them to act with less 'rectitude and disinterestedness' than individual persons, surely requires the existence of corporate purposes, strategies and wills.

But if there are general wills, what has them must resemble individual persons in being more or less free, more or less autonomous. Now, it is hard to deny that, all else equal, more liberty and autonomy, more opportunities for successful free choices, is an unalloyed prudential good. (The more good, the better!) But an understanding of that fact will move one to recognize that the main point of government is not, as Hamilton thought, to constrain the passions of men (or factions), but rather to maximize successful choices. Such maximization requires the precise deciphering of what is wanted by both persons and factions so that the utmost can be done to bring those states of affairs into existence.

In the case of social choices, let us call the methods for such precise deciphering and subsequent faithful endeavors to obtain what is wanted 'fair democratic procedures.' It will follow that the only restraints that are absolutely fundamental to a praiseworthy polity are those that are necessary to limit any activity—by person, institution, faction, or the government itself—that might serve to restrict or pervert the operation of fair democratic procedures.

[From the final chapter of Democratic Theory Naturalized: The Foundations of Distilled Populism]

I'm extremely proud of the endorsements that will appear on the back cover of my new book on democracy.

 

Here they are in full. (They were shortened to fit on the cover.)

Walter Horn's Democratic Theory Naturalized: The Foundations of Distilled Populism is a brave, serious, scholarly yet approachable treatise on populism, both in theory and in practice.  In the current moment when populism is too easily and readily associated with the unfettered and uneducated rule of the masses, Horn works tirelessly to defend its democratic bona fides while displaying the many ways in which what passes for democratic rule fails to represent the will of the people.  It is impossible to read this book without finding one's own views repeatedly challenged and positions that one has dismissed out of hand resurface in stronger form, arduously defended.  The general thesis is out of fashion from a theoretical point of view, but the joy and excellence of the book resides in the quality and character of the arguments brought to bear in its favor.  It's the kind of book that even a critic of the main thesis, as I am, cannot help but admire and would be a fool not to appreciate.  A timely book and quite an enjoyable read: hardly common features of serious works in political philosophy!

Jules Coleman, Senior Vice Provost, Emeritus and Professor of Philosophy, NYU (and author of The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory: Oxford University Press, 2003) 

**************************************************

Walter Horn provides a tour de force of ideas related to democracy, from a theory of value that leads to a conception of the purpose of democracy, to implications for the extent of the franchise, to ideas about the best ways for democracies to aggregate preferences and to implement representative government, and finally to a potpourri of recommendations for constitutional improvements. It is worthwhile food for thought for anyone concerned with how we ought to govern ourselves. 

 

Nicolaus Tideman, Professor of Economics, Virginia Tech (and author of Collective Decisions and Voting: Routledge, 2017)

Search Results

****************************************

This book combines rigorous philosophical analysis with normative political theory. It provides a bold and well-argued defense of democracy conceived basically as the government by majorities. It is stimulating reading, challenging for those who have started to doubt the relevancy of democratic values.

Eerik Lagerspetz
Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy, University of Turku (and author of Social Choice and Democratic Values: Springer, 2016)

https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/179362495X/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i0