Can Hyper-Polarization be Reduced by Altering Electoral Rules?

 

Ned Foley, Richard Pildes and Larry Diamond have recently put out--with a bit more fanfare than the usual book on democratic theory or voting rules can amass--a well-argued edited volume on how one might alter the U.S. electoral system in ways that will make the country less polarized and its governance more effective. The editors note that the book is the product of a task force comprised of 31 political scientists, law professors, and other scholars which was "formed in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021, attack at the Capitol aimed at disrupting the counting of votes in the 2020 presidential election." They go on to say that the purpose of the task force was to consider "possible institutional reforms to elections in the United States that would diminish extremism and polarization and hence the potential for future existential threats to American democracy." And, based on the book's contents we can surmise that whatever the differences of the members, they all agree that our "current system enhances rather than reduces the voice and power of extreme candidates and factions." Their goal, therefore was to identify reforms that could reverse the overrepresentation of extremists and ease polarization. 

I have just reviewed this important book here and urge those interested to have a look.

I confess, however, that in that review, I entirely ignored three chapters: one on Presidential primaries, by Robert Boatright, one on campaign finance, by Ray La Raja, and one on Presidential nominations, by Pildes and Frances Lee. My reason for those omissions is that the most central issues covered in the book, regarding the alleged benefits of Proportional Representation and multi-party governance over our First-Past-The-Post two-party, plurality Presidential system, seems to have been controversial among the task force members--both during and subsequent to publication of the book. Even with respect to the limited question of the expected effects of various proposals on the reduction of incentives for hyper-polarization, there has been nothing like unanimity on suggested reforms. So I focused entirely on that bundle of issues in my review.

I think, therefore, that I ought to at least summarize the recommendations made by the authors of the skipped contributions here.

In his chapter on Primaries, Boatright advocates the following:

• A national congressional primary day, and  the possibity of turning to compulsory voting. ​Both in interest of increasing turnout.
• Ranked-choice voting (RCV), preprimary conventions, and the expanded use of runoff elections. ​
• Allowing parties greater flexibility in the making of primary rules and clarifying the role of state parties in nonpartisan primaries. ​​
• Experimentation with alternatives like open and nonpartisan primaries. ​
• Strengthening the abiloity of parties to keep "unfit" and "extreme" candidates through preprimary conventions or endorsements. ​
• Elimination of "the sore loser" rule to allow defeated primary candidates access to the general election ballot. ​

In their Chapter on picking Presidents Pildes and Lee recommend:

• Adjustment of delegate-selection rules and the primary calendar to make contested conventions more likely. ​
• Allowing superdelegates to provide peer review, by having them vote on the second ballots if no candidate wins a majority on the first one.
• Mandating a preprimary endorsement process to ensure candidates are acceptable to party leadership. ​
• Giving party leaders and members of Congress the power to make votes of confidence or no confidence to presidential candidates prior to the start of any Presidential primaries. ​
• Providing more power to national political parties who they believe should take full control of the organizing and hosting of debates,

In his chapter on campaign finance Ray La Raja pushes for: ​

• Increased financing for political parties by raising contribution limits, removing or increasing limits on party-coordinated expenditures, and (possibly) public funding for parties. ​
• Improving transparency by requiring meaningful disclosure of major donations and passing antiretaliation legislation to protect donors. ​
• Raising contribution limits for multicandidate PACs and encouraging the formation of PACs  that would represent a broader spectrum of Americans. ​
• Experimentation with public subsidies for small donors, particularly within legislative districts, and consideration of the elimination of voluntary spending limits for candidates where public financing has been accepted. ​
• Elimination of the separation of party funds that are used for legal expenses which is thought might reduce incentives for election litigation.

I admit to having mixed feelings about some of these proposals, but however that may be, I want to at least point out that the arguments made on their behalf by the authors here are cogent and certainly worthy of further discussion.