Friday, October 21, 2022
Partisanship, Polarization, and Halloweenish Fears
Wednesday, September 14, 2022
The More Good, the Better vs. The Wheel of Samsara
It may seem that there is significant tension between what in Buddhist circles causes dukkha (the suffering that consists of existential dread) and the principle I rely on (borrowed from Everett Hall) for determining what makes both individual lives and societies well off: The More Good, the Better. After all, getting things is a condition for constant craving, and craving and clinging is thought to be the cause of suffering.
In my book I wrote the following regarding that apparent conflict:
It is generally agreed that it is worse to have unsatisfied wants than to have no wants at all (assuming one remains alive, sentient and autonomous). There may thus be (perhaps Vedantist- or Buddhist-tinged) concerns that truly good societies will not only contain the fewest individuals with unsatisfied desires, but the fewest individuals with any desires at all, and consequently, the fewest possible satisfactions or successes. Given such a perspective, CHOICE, with its focus on more, may seem to bestow its blessings on the most horrendous ‘wheel’ of craving—getting—craving that one can imagine. I think, however, that genuine autonomy is inconsistent with the complete absence of striving and getting. I therefore think we should handle this concern by construing desires and satisfactions broadly enough to consider “going beyond wanting” something that itself could be a successful choice. While it may seem that we are perversely attempting to call the absence of desire something that may be sought, it cannot be denied that a sort of bliss is often promised to those who succeed in attempts at asceticism. If the value of sadhana is considered somehow exempt from rebukes stemming from the praiseworthiness of giving up desires, it seems acceptable to count the seeking for this promised state of bliss a value and the finding of it a success. An autonomous person can’t “just be.”
The readers of this blog, who I presume are more interested in democratic theory than the psychology of religious experience may not realize that I once wrote a book (nearly 20 years ago) on mysticism and various religious practices:
So, these matters have some urgency for me. But I have come to the conviction that none of that actually matters so much. It’s not that I am no longer interested in those things--particularly Eastern religious views and practices--or that I no longer think that the tenets they preach have real importance for everyone’s life and wellbeing. That is not the case at all. But I have come to believe that, if we are to have any democracy at all, just as the principles underlying it must be exalted over any such legitimate concerns as climate change, abortion or prenate rights, what's owed to labor or capital, taxation policy, etc., its axioms of equal rights and procedural fairness must take precedence over every religious tenet too–from “the golden rule” and “turn the other cheek” to “the four noble truths” and "not this, not that." Taking any one of these religious doctrines to trump democracy means that the views of one’s peers on what is most important will sometimes be rightly demoted. We will have come to think that our own take on some value is to be given the highest importance regardless of what anybody else may believe. And that is an authoritarian take on the way public policies should be made.
No doubt this will be an extremely difficult conclusion for most people to reach. Certainly it has not been easy for me (see my discussion of Thanatos in my democracy book for a particularly dramatic example). But just as the great Oregonian progressive W. S. U’ren was at some point forced to demote his abiding love for a Georgist take on land value taxes in order to become a democratic reformer, all true democrats must always attenuate their own particular ends to a level below those of the people at large, always treating each person equally. For if they fail in that, they will cease to be any kind of authentic democrat at all.
So let those “enlightened ones” among us take what positions they will on suffering, emptiness, aggregates, selfhood, being, Brahman, Jesus, cravings and all the rest. If their views do not coincide with the general will, while they must given an appropriate volume of voice in public matters, they need not get their way–regardless of how crucial their faith may seem to them, or even how crucial it actually is to all of us. The more good, the better must be taken to prevail even over all of the religious credos. Indeed, it must take precedence even over the commands of any deity–no matter how great or good.
Monday, August 15, 2022
Democracy and Truth
My Hornbook review of Sophia Rosenfeld's fascinating Democracy and Truth: A Short History is now up at 3:16 AM Magazine here.
Thursday, August 4, 2022
Review of Democratic Theory Naturalized in The Journal of Value Inquiry
So delighted to see this thoughtful review of my Democratic Theory Naturalized: The Foundations of Distilled Populism by Daniel Layman. It's very generous, so I'm quite grateful and have but a couple of teensy nits I can't help but tug at.
The first one involves a sentence that suggests I don't believe in judicial review. I probably shouldn't blame Layman for this. Likely I was insufficiently clear on the matter in my book: perhaps I gave a misleading impression of my take on the judiciary when I defended a limited Reversal theory along the lines pushed by Teddy Roosevelt in his later, Progressive days. But, with or without Reversal, I'm a firm supporter of an independent judiciary and, more generally, the rule of law. Without that, I don't think there can be anything like authentic democracy--and that's kind of my summum bonum. There's a brief summary of my take on judicial review in a recent paper of mine on the inconsistency of legitimate democracy and "mob rule." (See especially footnote 23.)
My second (again inconsequential) beef is that The Journal of Value Inquiry only saw fit to mention the (wildly expensive) hardback edition of my text. There are now also the much cheaper paperback and e-book versions! Amazon sells the Kindle version for about $37. Still a lot, but quite a bit less than a C-note.
Anyhow, I'm done kvetching so you can start fetching! {But see my comment below!}
Sunday, July 17, 2022
Should "Legitimate" but "Unjust" Laws be Implemented and Obeyed?
In my previous blog entry on Laws, Legal Systems, and Government Power, I tried to explain the difference between laws that I take to be authoritative and those that I want to call not just authoritative, but also legitimate. The idea was, roughly, that a societal norm within some polity which has the formal features of a law is authoritative if and only if it emerges from procedures which are correct at every turn. I then claimed that while only authoritative laws can be legitimate, legitimacy additionally requires that the government prescribing the procedure for making laws is democratic. What that means is a longer story (see my book). but I don't mean to suggest that only perfectly democratic systems have legitimate laws--after all, there may not ever have been a perfectly democratic system in the history of our planet. I'm not now (and likely never will be) prepared to provide precise minimum requirements for a governmental system to be considered "democratic enough" to produce legitimate laws. But I will repeat what principles I consider to be basic to democracy. There must be universal suffrage including those in their mid-teens; every person must be treated equally, with no discrimination allowed on the basis of race, gender, orientation, etc.; the majority should rule, counting each vote equally--but significant minorities should be given a voice in government with the volume of that "voice" mirroring the size of the minority; elections must be "fair" and consequently not buyable; both the referendum and recall should be available to the electorate; and the elected governments must make good faith, transparent efforts to get the electorate what they want based on appropriately aggregated vote tallies.
It seems impossible to deny, however, that governments satisfying those minimal conditions could enact horrific laws that would, therefore, be legitimate according to my theory. Even if the principle of equal treatment prevents any law from calling for discrimination against any particular ethnicity or gender, it could still be the case that a legitimate statute is randomly inhuman or results in brutality to everyone, indiscriminately. Must judges apply such laws? Must citizens obey them? In the blog entry linked to above, I promised to do what I could to answer these questions. Here is my attempt.
The two distinguished gentlemen pictured above were German jurists in the Weimar Republic who were particularly interested in whether what the Nazis were soon to put into could reasonably be called laws, and they wrote about what obligations (if any) on judges and regular citizens followed from the passage of such commands. Now, of course, one can reasonably complain both that Hitler was not governing pursuant to majority rule and that very many of his putative laws certainly did involve unfair discrimination (quite essentially, in fact). So it's unproblematic to deny legitimacy to every edict emanating from the so-called "Third Reich."
But let's make this harder by considering some putative law that derives from a regime that is democratically elected and which doesn't discriminate against Jews (or Catholics or Blacks or Gypsies or Gays). This edict could surely remain brutish. Suppose, e.g., that the polity simply won't allow any citizen to emigrate. In fact, imagine that a law is (appropriately) enacted according to which, if anybody is caught trying even to briefly vacation elsewhere, that person may be disemboweled! (If we like, we can even hypothesize that after its passage, this anti-emigration law was subjected to a fairly conducted referendum and was kept in place by a majority of the populace.)
It might seem then, that, according to a strictly positivist legal theory--even one which contains my democracy criterion--(i) every judge should condemn to a horrible death anyone found guilty of violating this duly enacted provision, (ii) those with the prescribed duty (and scalpels) should carry out its hideous requirements, and (iii) if this polity utilizes juries (or trials at all!), everyone impaneled for such a case should declare guilty any individual he or she believes had the temerity to step over the border.
Does this hypothetical "law" show that legal positivism is a terrible mistake whether or not one adds democracy requirements to the criteria for legal legitimacy? Can civil disobedience really never just be the right thing to do? Both Radbruch and Neumann meditated on this matter--a particularly crucial one after the fall of Weimar. For Radbruch, the moral was beyond any doubt. Positivism is acceptable only until a law is so horrific that it exceeds any reasonable bounds of decency. He wrote that, "One thing...must be indelibly impressed on the consciousness of the people as well as of jurists: There can be laws that are so unjust and so socially harmful that validity, indeed legal character itself, must be denied them."* Radbruch believed that there might be obligations to carry out and obey even some unjust laws, but that there must be a limit. That line is where "the conflict between statute and justice reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute, as 'flawed law,' must yield to justice."** And he concluded that "Where there is not even an attempt at justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law...it lacks completely the very nature of law. For law...cannot be otherwise defined than as a system and an institution whose very meaning is to serve justice."
To the extent that this criterion, eloquent as it is put here, is conceived to essentially rely on the concept of equality of persons, it cannot not help us much, because we have already locked that criterion in when we insisted that only authentically democratic jurisdictions can enact legitimate laws. For there can be no democracy without equal treatment. We will, then, have to rely on Radbruch's more qualititative approach: it can't be legitimate if it's extremely bad.
In a valuable paper on Radbruch written about a decade ago,*** Brian Bix warns that we should not confuse support or criticism of legal positivism with any particular position regarding what putative laws ought to be obeyed. He writes, "Legal positivism is a theory about the nature of law, even if it is too often confused with entirely different kinds of claims (e.g., about when and whether laws should be obeyed, or about how statutes and constitutional provisions should be interpreted). Bix argues that it is crucial to distinguish any general theory concerning connections between law and morality from questions about how judges should decide any particular case and that Radbruch's admonitions must be restricted to the latter questions. According to Bix, one way of seeing this is to consider that legal positivism must be a theory about the nature of law in every conceivable jurisdiction while what judges should or should not do is necessarily a function of the particular system that the jurist happens to inhabit. Furthermore, as some jurisdictions clearly contemplate the use by judges of extra-legal norms in making their decisions, a determination that some proposition is not a law in those places would not entail what Radbruch wants--a norm absolutely requiring that any judge ignore the proposition in question because of the gross injustices it would call forth if enforced.
For our purposes here--involving the appropriateness of civil disobedience among judges, jurors and citizens in particular circumstances--we can focus only on this second interpretation of "Radbruch's Formula," and leave more general questions regarding alleged necessary connections/divergences between law and morality to others. Let us, therefore, continue to call procedurally correct laws ensuing from democracies "legitimate," and focus only on when we may nevertheless ignore them. Radbruch says, roughly, that we may do so when and only when they are particularly terrible. But that seems to offer very little help. When is a command so immoral that it is really, really terrible?
Neumann also addressed this issue. In a 1952 paper on appropriate disobedience,**** he provides what he takes to be four essential characteristics of the content of any legitimate edict. Like Radbruch, he starts with the legal equality of all rational persons, and he adds that nothing requiring slavery can be legitimate, since slavery requires inequality. Second, he says laws granting or limiting liberty must be general and not apply only to certain specified individuals. Third, retroactive or ex post facto legislation affecting life or liberty are claimed to be improper and so need not be obeyed. Finally, he tells us that the agencies enacting, interpreting, and enforcing laws must all be sufficiently separate.
Neumann claims here, without much argument, that his principles two, three, and four are derivable from the first, equality-endorsing axiom. That seems to me an extremely interesting and important claim if true, because any such derivation would seem to prevent a number of versions of illiberality in authentically democratic regimes. But I confess that I cannot myself see how retroactive law-making or parliamentary forms of government--distasteful as they may be to many observers--are inconsistent with providing everyone with equal treatment and protection. Democracy alone does not seem to me to prevent certain types of official cruelty (or require judicial independence) in instances where the people in that polity are themselves illiberal and cruel. In any case, if all the varieties of illiberality singled out by Neumann are made impossible by authentic democracy, I have not managed to see how or why.
Returning to his main argument, Neumann clearly believed that his four principles are all that we can appropriately agree upon as content-bases for legal legitimacy; but he also worried that they will not seem sufficient to everyone. He writes that his four reeds "may sound very thin and unsatisfactory." But he thinks that this will be so "only if we forget that man may morally resist any command of his government if his conscience impels him to do so." Why? Because, Neumann insists, "There cannot be made a universally valid statement telling us when man’s conscience may legitimately absolve him from obedience to the laws of the state. Every man has individually to wrestle with this problem. If he decides to resist, he cannot invoke a 'right,' but he will evoke our sympathy. Beyond the four statements on the unconditional right of resistance, each man must make his decision." (Interestingly, he appeals to Hegel's early-19th Century Philosophy of Right for this individualistic stance.)
A "you'll-have-to-figure-this-out-yourself" stance certainly appeals to me in this area, for, as I have written elsewhere, while I believe that moral claims are like factual propositions in either being true or false, and even think that they may be warranted to some extent for a particular individual (perhaps by her emotional responses to various states of affairs), no human being seems to me ever to be in a position to know the truth of any ethical judgment. For it is my view that any such knowledge would require a reasonable and at least partially justified general theory of morality, and I don't think those exist.***** Moral claims therefore seem to me akin to astrological predictions, for those are also true or false, and may in some cases be inductively warranted. But, being (let's say) "unhinged," they can also never be known to be the case. As my book shows, I am much more comfortable about our epistemic relations with propositions involving prudential value than with those involving morality.
To conclude, whether or not civil disobedience is appropriate in a particular situation is, without doubt, a strictly moral matter, and as I am a skeptic with respect to moral knowledge, I believe Neumann was right. We will each have to let our own conscience be our guide.
* "Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy" (1945)
** "Statutory Lawlessness and Super-Statutory Law" (1946)
*** "Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis" (2011)
**** "On the Limits of Justifiable Disobedience" (1952)
***** Most of those that have been offered have been species of hedonism, and no form of moral consequentialism seems to me to have fared very well after being subjected to centuries of criticism. I will admit, however, that I have just been informed of a new paper suggesting an entirely different sort of theory: Andre, DeBove, et al., "Moral Cognition as a Nash Product Maximizer" (2022). Perhaps something along those contractualist/game theory lines will do better than any version of consequentialism has to date, though I have my doubts.
Monday, June 20, 2022
My Review of Rick Hasen's Cheap Speech
Thursday, June 16, 2022
What makes for a stable democratic regime?
My sense is that a comparative politics guru could likely settle this "authority patterns" doctrine once and for all quite quickly. So I hope some of those folks will check it out!
(BTW, if my article seems dry or abstruse, it may help to contemplate while reading it that after escaping Nazi Germany as a child and in spite of publishing a ton of important work and teaching at Princeton as an adult, Eckstein somehow also managed to get married four times.)
Friday, June 3, 2022
Democratic Theory Naturalized is Out in Paperback!
Lexington Books has just notified me that my book, Democratic Theory Naturalized, will available in paperback this Fall at a price of $39.99.
I like this of course, but if you don't want to wait until September, there's already an e-book version available at $45, and Amazon is currently selling the hardback for $53 (unlike R & L, which still lists it for over $100). See this for details.
I'd naturally like to see a price that's in the vicinity $9.99--I mean, in spite of the fact that the book is...you know... absolutely life-altering, priceless stuff! But even a slightly cheaper imprint is obviously a good thing. And, as the book attempts to pound home repeatedly, The more good, the better.
Anyhow, if you've been waiting patiently for a paperback version, you can now order a copy at Rowman & Littlefield or Amazon! Cheers!
Tuesday, May 17, 2022
Does Democracy Require Meritocratic Elitism?
Anne Applebaum's new book is called The Twilight of Democracy, and she is quite distraught about the fading away of...well...something. It's certainly not democracy, though. She's in mourning for the diminution of the nearly worldwide power and prestige once held by her particular cohort: a group consisting mainly of wealthy, center-right, libertarian-leaning intellectuals and corporate big shots.
Friday, April 22, 2022
Laws, Legal Systems, and Government Power
But if even if the general idea of positivism now reigns supreme, it can't be denied that there are some fairly deep differences among the positions advocated by some of positivism's most widely known champions. In particular, perhaps the movement's two greatest figures--the Victorian Benthamite John Austin and the 20th Century Oxonian H.L.A. Hart--were on the opposite sides of several central issues of legal philosophy. For example, while Austin insisted that every law is essentially an order backed by threats, deriving ultimately from the sovereign, i.e., the most powerful person or group in the land, Hart denied such a reduction. On his view, where there are laws, there must be rules, non-purely-behavioral norms that produce obligations from a specifically "internal point of view." So, while both philosophers were, let's say, Earthians rather than supernaturalists, Austin took the behaviorist (and exclusively "external") view that laws are just commands emanating from habitually-obeyed-and-subject-to-no-higher-power sources, so long as those commands reliably produce the demanded responses among those who are subject to them.
Each of those two eminent theorists required both the procedural imprimatur (to be authoritative, laws must have been created in the appropriate way) and habitual compliance among most citizens. But Hart argued not only that many laws simply aren't commands backed by threats of penalties for scofflaws, but also that, even if they were nothing but orders of that kind--each analogous to "Your money or your life!" widespread habits of compliance (even among just the right people) would be insufficient to make them lawlike. To be obliged or compelled, Hart argued, isn't the same thing as to carry out an action as a result of an obligation. And Hart argued that laws uniquely carry obligitoriness--or at least they always produce that sense among the officials who are in charge of carrying them out. So, even in those cases where a large segment of the citizenry just obeys because they're worried about trouble they'll be in if they fail to do so, the appropriate internal attitude among those in charge will make a command or power-conferring rule a law.
Like all the most world-altering and influential philosophy books (and for all I know, this is true in every discipline), Hart's book has suffered from the notorious "thousand cuts" delivered by critics. As one philosopher put it to me long ago, when Plato wrote his Republic, Spinoza his Ethics, Kant his first Critique, Rawls his Theory of Justice, Wittgenstein his Tractatus, etc., it was like a huge and majestic elephant taking a step out from a dense jungle into an open, sunlit field....only to be slowly and painfully devoured by a multitude of army ants. Whether or not that analogy is entirely fair, it can't be denied that Hart's classic has suffered that fate to some extent. In particular, numerous criticisms have been levelled at his reliance on "secondary rules" to do the work of giving putative laws the teeth of authority and legitimacy. Hart claimed that it is these second-order rules, items like To be engrossed in the House, a bill (such as a penalty for burglary) must receive three readings" which provide the authority of first-order instructions regarding how we are supposed to behave. He argued that it is the existence of secondary rules and their placement in the array of injunctions and proper procedures in which they are found that indicate when any lower-order rule is part of a legal system.
Tuesday, March 15, 2022
My Review of Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism & Parliamentarism
Is there a best sort of governmental arrangement? Is the U.S. system with its President and Congress better than England's Westminster system, with its Parliment and Prime Minister? Or is some other type best--perhaps a structure that's never been used?
My newest Hornbook review is of Steffen Ganghof's book on this subject. Spoiler: He endorses a system called "semi-parliamentarism." He talks (quite acutely) about a bunch of other interesting and important stuff too, like the benefits and demerits of different sorts of electoral systems, how best to avoid authoritarianism, etc. I discuss at least some of this in my new review at 3:16 AM, which can be found here.
Thursday, January 20, 2022
My Review of Robert Talisse's Sustaining Democracy: What We Owe the Other Side
My latest Hornbook Review over at 3:16 AM is of the above-pictured book. While flawed in certain ways, I think it makes an important contribution to political psychology in our turbulent times. Talisse's diagnosis of our tendencies to polarize and his suggestions for what we can do about it both seem to me right on the money.
Tuesday, January 4, 2022
Two New Book Reviews
The latest two of my "hornbook" democracy reviews now up at 3:16 AM are of the "debate book" by Michael Huemer and Daniel Layman on whether political authority is an illusion here, and of Joshua Spivak's little primer on recall elections here.
Check 'em out!
Oh, and Happy (tho I'm not expecting much myself) 2022!
Tuesday, October 26, 2021
The Proof is in the Polling
Back when the atrocities of January 6 were fresh in our minds, I wrote a piece called "Who Cares About Democracy?" in which I opined that the answer is "Almost nobody."
his overall vote share. When we restrict attention to candidate-choice scenarios with combinations of partisanship and policies that we typically see in real-world elections, this punishment drops to 3.5%.
2. Support for democracy is highly elastic: When the price of voting for a more democratic candidate is that candidate’s greater distance from the voter in terms of her preferred policies, even the most centrist voters are willing to tolerate at most a 10–15% increase in such a distance.
3. Centrists are a pro-democratic force: “Centrist” voters who see small policy differences between candidates punish undemocratic behavior at four times the rate of “extremist” voters who strongly favor one of the candidates.
4. Most voters are partisans first and democrats only second: Only about 13.1% of our respondents are willing to defect from a co-partisan candidate for violating
democratic principles when the price of doing so is voting against their own party. Only independents and partisan “leaners” support more democratic candidates
enough to defeat undemocratic ones regardless of their partisan affiliation.
5. Supporters of both parties employ a partisan “double standard”: Respondents who identify as Republican are more willing to punish undemocratic behavior by Democratic Party than Republican Party candidates and vice versa. These effects are about equal among both Democrat and Republican respondents.
Friday, October 15, 2021
Even a Powerful Majoritarianism Cannot be Tyrannous If It is Truly Democratic
In my humble opinion, there is WAY too much talk about "the tyranny of the majority." What the majority has long been, in the U.S. anyhow, is not tyrannous but feeble. Nevertheless, there is a deep-set fear of violent hordes here, and our Constitution is befouled with a bunch of unnecessary separations of power, a bicameral legislature, an Electoral College, and assorted other enfeebling provisions. The reasons that stuff is in there, of course, and the arguments for retaining all it, center around fear: fear of a "mobocracy," fear of armed brown shirts, fear of sans-culottes, fear of Bolshevism.
Of course, all of those items are quite sensibly feared. (Think of January 6th for example!) But what is missed by the fearful defenders of our cowering Constitution is that none of those groups, events, or "isms" had very much to do with democracy, even with democracy of the most radical kind. That's what my new paper, "Why Radical Democracy is Inconsistent with 'Mob Rule'" is about.
It has just come out in the new issue of The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics and is available for free download here.

